



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Legislative Liaison

Washington, D. C. 20505

Telephone: [redacted] 10 MARCH 1984

TO: Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Staff Director
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

(b) (1)
(b) (3)

Dear Tom:

Enclosed are the questions and answers to the 31 January 1984 briefing. The transcript is still being reviewed and will be returned to you within the next few days.

Thank you.

[redacted]
Liaison Division

Enclosure

FORM 3-79 **1533** OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(40)

4/19/06
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2006

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Responses to HPSCI Questions of 31 January 1984

FROM:		EXTENSION		NO.
Duane R. Clarridge <input type="checkbox"/> Chief, Latin America Division		<input type="checkbox"/>		DATE 15 Mar 84
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) 0-1: Per our conversation, for onward routing as appropriate. HPSCI has requested these responses by COB 15 MAR 84.
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
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SUBJECT: 31 January 1984 HPSCI Questions for the Record
Re: Central America

QUESTION 1: Please provide a current inventory of the air and naval assets of the FDN, ARDE, and the Miskitos. Identify whether these assets were provided by the CIA or obtained from other sources.

ANSWER: The current inventory of FDN, Misura, and ARDE air and maritime assets is as follows:

INVENTORY

AIRCRAFT

FDN

PROJECT SUPPORT

*C-47 1
+O-2 3

*Hughes H-500D 1
U.S. Army UH-1H 3
(Bailment)
U.S. Army TH-55 4
(Bailment)
**Beechcraft Baron 1
Cessna 202 1

*Note: One C-47 lost and will soon receive a replacement.

BOATS

FDN/MISURA

PROJECT SUPPORT

*Zodiak Rubber Boats 6
w/motors

Several Pangos
(small native fishing canoes)

Misura - none

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QUESTION 1: Please provide a current inventory of the air and naval assets of the FDN, ARDE, and the Miskitos. Identify whether these assets were provided by the CIA or obtained from other sources.

ANSWER: (Continued)

ARDE INVENTORY

AIRCRAFT

*Hughes H-500D	1
+Baron A56TC	1
+Baron 95B55	1
+Hughes H-500D	2

BOATS

*Zodiak rubber boat	4
w/motor	
+Aqua Sport Craft	4
+Canoe type boats	Several

*Acquired with U.S. funds
+Acquired from non-CIA sources
**Purchased

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Re: Central America

QUESTION 2:

ANSWER:

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
SUBJECT: 31 January 1984 HPSCI Questions for the Record
Re: Central America

QUESTION 3:

ANSWER:

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


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
QUESTION 4:



ANSWER:



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Re: Central America

QUESTION 5: [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

However, a Washington Post article of 20 February 1984 stated: "Nicaraguan counterrevolutionary guerrillas battered in their most recent offensive and discouraged by worsening diplomatic climate have given up last Autumn's hopes of seizing the slice of territory early this year, senior rebel officials said in recent interviews. Instead of announcing major gains this month, as it hoped, the main guerrilla group is struggling to solve supply problems and trying to establish closer ties with other major groups battling Nicaragua's left-wing Sandinista government". Other news reports have indicated a large number of rebels have returned to Honduras.

The Committee would appreciate an overall assessment on the status of the anti-Sandinista forces to include their disposition, logistic situation, ability to put pressure on the Sandinista government, [redacted]


[redacted] they might be. If the DDI and the DDO have differing interpretations, a highlighting of differences would be appreciated.

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ANSWER: (QUESTION 5) [REDACTED]



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SUBJECT: 31 January 1984 HPSCI Questions for the Record
Re: Central America

ANSWER: (Continued from previous page)

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QUESTION 6: In testimony before the Committee on 21 September 1983, Mr. Casey stated, "Our policy, and I think I have said it very clearly here, the FDN policy has been not to target economic objectives in the way the Salvadoran guerrillas do, to destroy economic assets and to bring general pressure on the populace and on the government. The FDN has been very careful not to antagonize the citizens of Nicaragua by hitting economic targets for the sake of hitting economic targets. However, when economic targets are military related, they have targeted and that policy has not changed."

ANSWER: The statement made by Director Casey in testimony presented before this Committee on 21 September 1983, represents the view of both the DDO and DDI. The insurgents' primary objective is to attack militarily related economic targets. On occasion, however, they target state-owned economic facilities in order to cause general disruptions in their areas of operation and to divert Sandinista military attention, thus detracting from the FSLN war effort. We believe that the insurgency has inflicted relatively little damage on Nicaragua's economy. We estimate that in 1983, the resistance forces caused roughly \$30 million in direct and indirect damage to the economy which equals only one percent of the GDP. Raids on POL storage facilities are designed to interrupt the transportation of military vehicles such as helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, armored personnel carriers and tanks, and have caused only \$6 million in damages and destroyed fuel. Successful raids such as the assault on Corinto have had a direct bearing on the Sandinista military since their fuel consumption requirements have increased due to the Soviet Union and Cuba's major effort to improve the FSLN's military mobility which is highly mechanized and dependent on diesel fuel stocks. Finally, it should be noted that the strategy of the Nicaraguan resistance forces of attacking oil facilities - and the relatively little damage inflicted on Nicaragua's vital agricultural sector - contrasts markedly with the aims and successes of the guerrillas in neighboring El Salvador.

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QUESTION 7: Can the Contra groups - as presently supplied and armed and in their present numbers - seriously threaten Sandinista control of the country, either military ~~control or political control?~~

--If not, what can the continuation of this insurgency accomplish?

-- Does this program have a likely end point in the foreseeable future?

ANSWER: As presently supplied and armed and in their present numbers, the insurgency represents a serious political and paramilitary threat to the Sandinista regime. However, the insurgent forces do not have the heavy weapons needed to defeat the EPS mainline units in the lowlands, []
[] The credibility of this insurgency as a military threat to the FSLN has, we believe, increased over the last year as a result of successful sabotage and air attacks, defections from the Sandinista ranks, and increased popular support due to continuing Sandinista repression. The very workers, peasants, and small landholders the Sandinista revolution was supposed to represent are now fighting against the FSLN.

The military pressure being levied by the resistance forces has caused the initiation of long-sought diplomatic initiatives, such as the Contadora group proposals, the call for early elections, and the recent moves by European and Latin American countries to pressure Nicaragua to fulfill its commitments to pluralism and basic human rights. []

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SUBJECT: 31 January 1984 HPSCI Questions for the Record
Re: Central America

ANSWER: (Continued from previous page)

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QUESTION 8: What, if anything, have Contra groups - particularly the FDN - done to disrupt the coffee harvest?

~~--- What does such disruption accomplish? ---~~

ANSWER: The insurgents have not specifically attempted to disrupt the coffee harvest. While they have occasionally attacked targets of opportunity such as state-owned coffee warehouses, their overall impact on the coffee harvest has been minimal. The Sandinistas have stated publicly that despite insurgent activity, they have harvested 95 percent of the coffee crop.

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QUESTION 9:

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[REDACTED]

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QUESTION 10: According to the incident reports which you provide the Committee on a monthly basis, in November 1983, the Contras claim that they killed 610 Nicaraguan troops and wounded 122 while incurring only 39 casualties -- 18 killed-in-action and only 21 wounded. For the month of December, the Contras claimed that they killed 944 Sandinista soldiers and wounded 659.

-- Do you think that their reporting is accurate as to the casualties inflicted on Nicaraguan forces?

ANSWER: Due to the nature of guerrilla warfare, there are no corroborated casualty counts available from Nicaraguan resistance forces. Under the category of EPS casualties, two separate claims are carried. We estimate that FDN and ARDE claims of EPS casualties are overstated by a minimum of twenty percent, while Sandinista claims of their losses do not include wounded.

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QUESTION 11:

[Redacted]

ANSWER:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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QUESTION 12:

[REDACTED]

ANSWER:

[REDACTED]

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QUESTION 13: Another effort is presently underway to unite the FDN and ARDE, along with the Miskitos, under a single Contra directorate. The effort is described as "Convergence." What would be the advantage gained by uniting these groups?

-- What is the likelihood that this latest attempt will be successful?

ANSWER: Convergence would have the desired effect of increasing and concentrating political pressure on the Sandinista regime. Additionally, it would result in coordination of paramilitary operations and would greatly simplify logistics support. While all insurgent groups realize unity is inevitable and desirable, efforts to achieve this objective are being thwarted by their unwillingness to compromise their individual equities. Despite these frustrations, we will continue to do our utmost to effect unity among all resistance forces, recognizing that convergence can only be achieved by the Nicaraguans themselves. At this juncture, it is difficult to predict the likelihood of success.

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QUESTION 14: When did you receive NSPG authorization to

[REDACTED]

ANSWER:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: 31 January 1984 HPSCI Questions for the Record
Re: Central America Funding

QUESTION 1: Roughly one-half of the FY 84 funding available for this program has been expended to date. When will you run out of money?

-- Will you ask for more money?

-- If so, how much will you need and how will you propose to obtain it?

ANSWER: At the current rate of expenditures, we anticipate running out of money by 15 May. \$21 million will be required for the remainder of the fiscal year. We plan to obtain these additional funds via appropriate congressional funding mechanisms.

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SUBJECT: 31 January 1984 HPSCI Questions for the Record
Re: Central America Funding

QUESTION 2: What have you told the Contra groups about funding in the coming months?

-- Do they expect that there will be a review of this program soon which will determine whether it should continue?

-- How specifically are you responding [REDACTED]

-- Are there viable alternative funding sources to which the Contras can look if U.S. aid is ended or significantly restricted?

ANSWER: The Nicaraguan insurgents are well aware of the funding restrictions imposed by Congress and realize that this program is under continuous review. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There are no viable alternative funding sources.

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